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The topic assigned to me in this Masterclass on 'The Republic 's M o n e y ' is Geld 
en bedrijf, a formulation that most economie historians, I suspect, would prefer 
to see turned around. Rather than giving priority to money over economie 
activity, most economie historians would be more comfortable with the emphasis 
placed on the 'real economy' - production, technology, Organization, labor - with 
the monetary phenomena that flow from these real factors, that emerge to 
accommodate them, placed second. 
The formulation as presented to me implies an active rather than a passive 
role for money in economie history; it invites us to consider seriously the claims 
of monetarists and the autonomous role of financial institutions. This is not a 
perspective that cornes naturally to someone trained as an agrarian historian. 
Indeed, in The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age1 I discussed price 
history only in one of the final chapters, and declared its value to be chiefly in its 
capacity to reflect changes in the real economy. However, my more recent book, 
co-authored with A d van der Woude, the chapter on money comes much earlier, 
in our account o f the structures that shape the economy. 2 To be sure, we continue 
to affirm the primacy of the real economy over monetary forces (p. 163), but we 
acknowledge the role of financial institutions in giving shape - and at times 
direction - to the Republic 's economy. 3 
Regardless o f one's theoretical posture regarding the active or passive role 
of money and about the institutions that govern its use, the fact remains that the 
base of knowledge about the Republic's money upon which any historical 
interprétations must rest is very small. Moreover, the generalizations that have 
come down to us from historians of an earlier era (most o f the available literature 
dates from the interbellum) are often contradictory. 
In many respects the money of the Republic was the money of Europe, and 
the Republic's financial institutions were part and parcel o f a broad and complex 
international historical process. N o one can tell the story of Dutch money without 
constantly looking across the borders to the rest o f Europe. The very term florijn 
rerninds us ofthat fact. Yet, the common ingrédients o f monetary history combined 
in the Republic to achieve something unusual. Somehow, people used money and 
adopted financial institutions in ways that distinguish the Republic from other 
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societies o f the time. But, whether we think in terms of Dutch exceptionality (De 
Nederlandse geschiedenis als afivijking van het algemeen menselijk patroon) or o f 
Dutch precociousness (The First Modern Economy5), the problem remains that we 
have at present only suggestive fragments o f historical information, and no general 
framework in which to interpret the Republic's monetary experience. Therefore, 
this essay w i l l more often pose questions than answer them. 
The functions of money and its supply in the Republic 
The functions of money are conventionally defined as 1. providing a unit o f 
account, and 2. serving as a means of payment. 6 
To function as a unit o f account - to be the numeraire for the valuation o f all 
marketed goods and services - a monetary unit must be defined and defended, 
neither o f which is as simple as it seems.7 The monetary standard of the state and 
the monetary practice of the market have often been two quite different things. 
Indeed, the entire first century of the Republic's monetary history was spent 
bringing these two into conformity. 8 
To function as a means of payment a currency's usefulness depends on the 
answers to three questions: 1. is it recognized as a medium of exchange now? 2. 
w i l l it be recognized in the future at its current purchasing power (i.e., does it serve 
as a store of value)? 3. are there facilities to use this currency over space, in 
fulfilling obligations internationally. In short, the usefulness of a currency as a 
means of payments depends on acceptance, stability, and transferability (today, 
convertibility). Not all currencies are equally strong in all three dimensions. 
(Today, the U.S . dollar continues to excel in 1 and 3, even though the Deutschmark 
has been superior in 2.) A feature of pre-modern coinages, also in the Republic, 
was the emergence of specialized coins for functions 1 and 3: the standpenningen 
for mainly domestic use and the negotiepenningen for particular foreign markets. 
H o w much money circulated in the Republic, and how useful was it? 
Estimating the money supply would seem to be the obvious starting point in any 
study of a country's monetary and financial history, but in the case of the Republic 
there is virtually no literature on this subject. Only a couple o f perhaps foolhardy 
foreigners have so much as touched on this subject.9 The reason for this is not far to 
seek. Money flowed freely, and silver and gold bars (bullion) flowed with few 
effective restrictions, in and out o f the Republic. In the absence o f records o f these 
large flows, the traditional method of estimating the money supply would seem to 
be powerless. That method is based on the measurement o f mint output. 
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Nurnismatic studies provide reliable information about the production of 
coin in most periods (although the poorly regulated small mints in fhe Republic 's 
eastern provinces form an exception to this rule), 1 0 Knowing the annual output o f 
the mints, one can estimate fhe money stock once one serties on an average period 
of circulation for the produced coins (before they disappear, wear out, and are 
returned to the mints for reminting). 
But, of course, much of the Republic's mint output was intended for 
export. The negotiepenningen were coins modeled after those already in use in 
international trade in the chief zones where the Republic always ran balance of 
trade deficits: the Baltic (which favored the rijksdaalder), the Levant (where the 
leeuwendaalder ruled), and As ia (which was partial to the dukaat). These and 
many other Dutch coins flowed out of fhe Republic in an unending stream. 
It is equally obvious that foreign coin entered the Republic, where it 
circulated along with the domesncally-minted supply. This was notoriously true 
between 1612 and 1659, when a slightly over-valued Southern Netherlands 
coinage - the ducaton and patacon - flooded the Republic. 
While we know something about fhe nature of these in- and outflows, we 
know little about fheir quantitative volume. The volume o f minting in the Southern 
Netherlands is known. Fueled by the massive silver shipments from Spain to 
support the Spanish military effort during the Eighty Years ' War, southern mints 
produced more coin in the 1612-1659 period than did all the mints o f the Republic. 
We also know that the large trade deficits incurred by the Spanish Netherlands with 
fhe Republic (a classic example of handel op de vijand) sent most o f the massive 
southern coinage north, a movement strengfhened by the workings of Gresham's 
L a w (the southern coins had the same face value as similar Republican coins, but 
contained 4 percent less silver). 
A s for the export o f coin, we can refer to the studies of international bull ion 
flows by Artur At tman." He estimâtes trade balances between the Netherlands and 
the major deficit régions and then proceeds to guess at the value of gold and silver 
that must have flowed from the Republic to cover those deficits. The estimated 
outflows are enormous, exceeding total Republican mint output at every date from 
1600 to 1780. One might, as I do, question Attman's estimâtes, but fhe fact remains 
that bull ion exports and the export o f Dutch-minted coin are not fhe same thing. 
The latter was a subset - perhaps a small one - o f the former, as Spanish and other 
foreign coin as well as bullion proper figured prominently in Dutch monetary 
exports. 
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These observations w i l l suffice to indicate the considerable obstacles that 
stand in the way of estimating the size of the money supply that actually circulated 
within the Republic. In Nederland 1500-1815 V a n der Woude and I threw caution 
to the winds to propose rough estirnates of the Republic's money supply at several 
benchmark dates.1 2 These estirnates are guided by evidence on mint production and 
in- and outflows of coin (with all the caveats alluded to above). They are reinforced 
by another source, one not used before to address this issue: the probate 
inventories. 
Probate inventories usually record the cash on hand in the home of the 
deceased, and often specify precisely which coins - ducaten, rijders, rijksdaalders, 
Spaanse stucken van acht, etc. O f course, the cash on hand at the time of death may 
not be typical o f the cash reserves of the living, but the evidence, which is abundant 
and awaits a fuller investigation, is intriguing. Hollanders held enormous cash 
reserves. Probate inventories do not usually illuminate the possessions of the poor, 
but where they do, as in Thera Wijssenbeek's study of eighteenth century Delft and 
Anne McCants current work on Amsterdam orphans, the surprising fact is 
uncovered that poor households - many with negative net assets - had 20 to 30 
guilders o f cash on hand, which was the equivalent to at least as many days pay for 
a manual worker. 1 3 
Among the better off households, cash reserves were usually in the 
hundreds, and among the rich often in the thousands of guilders. These frndings, 
which deserve a more comprehensive study than has occurred thus far, seem to 
confirm what the niinting records suggest: that the Republic's money supply, 
adjusted for population growth and price inflation - the real, per capita money stock 
- grew rapidly in the century after the Revolt, and continued to grow in the 
eighteenth century as well . A per capita money supply that may not have exceeded 
5 guilders before the Revolt, stood near 60 guilders in 1690 and grew to 
approximately 100 guilders a century later. 
When we compare these estirnates with the most recent estirnates of the 
French and English money supplies (Table 1), the Republic stands out in two ways: 
1. the Republic had a much larger per capita stock, two to three times as large as 
England's, the nearest competitor; 2. the differentials between the Republic and 
these two countries grew larger, no only in the seventeenth century, but also in the 
eighteenth. 
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Table 1. Est imâtes o f the money supply in England, France, and the Dutch 
Republic, 1540-1790 
England France Republic 
(£) (l.t.) (guilders) 
1540 1.5 million 45 million 5 million 
1690 12 million 500 million 120 million 
1790 25 million 2100 million 200 million 
Per capita converted to 
guilders 
England France Republic 
1540 6.3 2.5 5 
1690 29.4 18.5 60 
1790 33.4* 35.4 100 
Coinage only; bank note issue, which played a major rôle in eighteenth Century England, is 
not included in these estimâtes. 
Sources: N.J. Mayhew, 'Population, Money Supply, and the Velocity of Circulation in 
England, 1300-1700', Economie History Review 48 (1995) 238-257; James C. Riley and 
John J. McCusker, 'Money Supply, Economie Growth, and the Quantity Theory of Money: 
France, 1650-1788', Explorations in Economie History 20 (1983) 274-293; Debra Glassman 
and Angela Redish, 'New Estimâtes of the Money Stock in France, 1493-1680', Journal of 
Economie History 45 (1985) 31-46; L.E. Challis, The Tudor Coinage (Manchester 1978); 
De Vries and Van der Woude, Nederland 1500-18J5, Table 4.2. 
Now, i f these conclusions are not far from the mark, they raise a number of 
important questions for the Republic's monetary regime and about the way people 
used their money. W h y was the demand for cash balances so large? Were these 
large balances a sign of prosperity or rather a symptom of a poorly functioning 
fïnancial system? W h y did the stock of money grow, relative to per capita income, 
in fhe eighteenth Century? In the light o f the quantity équation, M V = PT , the 
growfh of M (fhe stock of money) in a period of minor rise of the price level (P) 
and of apparently little growth the the volume of transactions (T) leads us to the 
necessary conclusion that the velocity of circulation (V) must have declined. D i d 
hoarding become more common in fhe eighteenth Century man before? This 
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counter-intuitive conclusion, to which we are led by the terms of the monetary 
identity, leads us directly to a second theme, the role of banking and credit creation 
in augmenting the basic money supply of the Republic. 
Banking and credit creation 
Modern measurements o f the money supply make a distinction between 'high-
powered money' - the cash in circulation - and broader indicators, which in the 
United States go by the names M l (cash plus demand deposits - checking account 
balances) and M 2 ( M l plus time deposits - savings account balances). A s checks 
and credit operations supplement the basic money supply in satisfying the demand 
for means of payment they also speed the velocity o f circulation, thereby 
increasing the effective supply. Each dollar, or guilder, works harder, as it were, in 
covering the transactions of the economy. 
What was the experience of the Republic? Except in brief emergency 
situations, the Republic issued no paper money, and had no banking institutions 
that did so. In this respect, the late-eighteenth century Republic was very 
conservative, avoiding the pitfalls o f French experience (with John L a w ' s 
monetary scheme of 1720 and the revolutionary assignat), but also avoiding the 
advantages of English practice, where bank notes substantially supplemented the 
coinage measured in Table 1, above. 
The Republic issued no bank notes, but this is not to say that there was no 
supplement to the money stock of klinkende munt. To begin with, there were the 
bills o f exchange {wisselbrieven), the classic credit instrument o f international 
trade. Their use spread from Italy to Flanders in the late middle ages, and on to the 
Northern Netherlands in the sixteenth century. I w i l l not rehearse here the story of 
the spread and refinement of the b i l l o f exchange, 1 4 except to note that its spread to 
the commercial centers o f the north was not especially rapid. Baltic trade had never 
made much use of the b i l l o f exchange, the merchants of the Hanseatic League 
preferring a simpler debt instrument known as the letter obligatory. After the 
Revolt, as commercial practices dependent upon the b i l l o f exchange spread with 
the diaspora of Flemish traders, Amsterdam proved resistant to the spread o f bills 
among parties who were not part o f the underlying commodity trade from which a 
given b i l l had originated. Thus, the Bank of Amsterdam, or Wisselbank, was 
established in 1609 in part to stop what the Keur van 1608 described as 
'' menichvuldich assigner en ende overwijsen van d'een op d'ander, bijnae sonder 
eynde'. But soon the practices pioneered in Antwerp were also accepted in the 
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north, and, indeed, extended and refined, as the bills trade o f all Europe came to be 
concentrated in Amsterdam. The b i l l o f exchange became more fhan simply 1. a 
short-term credit instrument between buyer and seller and 2. a means o f clearing 
payments between distant places without the actual transport o f coin. The b i l l 
became negotiable, a means of payment independent o f the originating 
international transaction. This occurred as the assignment o f bills became legal, as 
each person who accepts a b i l l takes responsibility for payment i f the original 
drawee (getrokkene) defaults. It occurred also as bills became discountable, when 
the bearer surrenders a b i l l to a fhird party before the due date in consideration of a 
cash payment. 
When all this was achieved, bills became a flexible supplement to the 
money supply and extended the currency's reach to distant places (fulfilling the 
third criterion for a useful means of payment). The Bank of Amsterdam was 
founded as a deposit bank to provide for the orderly payment of bills o f exchange; 
in fact its charter obligated merchants to present all bills valued at 600 guilders at 
the bank for payment. The fast and safe transfer o f funds from account to account 
was undoubtedly a convenience for merchants, and it must have speeded the 
velocity o f circulation of the money held in deposit. Account holders at the 
Amsterdam Wisselbank numbered some 2,000 by the 1650s, and over 1,500 by 
1700. Moreover, Middelburg, Delft, and Rotterdam also established banks that 
provided these same services, although on a much smaller scale. Middelburg's 
bank had over 400 depositors by 1700 and deposits of about two mi l l ion guilders, 
about one-tenth of the size of Amsterdam's deposits. 
The Wisselbank archive includes account books recording transfers to and 
from each account holder. These would seem to be an under exploited resource. I 
am personally aware of only a single student research paper that examined the 
records for a single year, 1707, o f the 26 largest depositors in the Bank of 
Amsterdam. These 26 depositors, one percent o f all account holders, were 
responsible for 33 percent o f the Bank's total turnover for this year. The largest o f 
them, the banker George Clifford, generated 1524 transactions involving nearly 11 
mil l ion guilders. Yet his average deposit in the Bank was only a small fraction of 
this amount, about one-twentieth. Clifford was no typical depositor, but his ratio of 
deposits to transactions was typical, it seems, for all 26 large depositors examined 
in this study generated over 25,000 transactions with an average value o f over 
3,000 guilder each, for a total turnover of 79 mil l ion guilders. 
To be frank, I am not certain what to make of these findings. They seem to 
reveal a frantic velocity o f circulation that direcfly contradicts the claim made by 
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the great historian of the Wisselbank, J. G . van Dil len , that after 1683, when specie 
deposits came to be accepted, the Bank's assets tended to sit in the vaults for long 
periods o f t ime. 1 5 The reason for this was the Bank's innovation of issuing receipts 
(recepissen) to the depositors of specie. These receipts could circulate as a means 
of payment for the duration of the deposit. We see here a limited form o f note 
issue. O f course, these receipts did not much augment the money supply, since a 
guilder (technically, a guilder worth of foreign coin or bullion) sat in the vaults o f 
the Stadhuis for every guilder in receipts that circulated on the streets. 
The Wisselbank did not issue notes, nor did it (legally) make loans. It was 
not a modern fractional reserve bank, and it is, according to Herman van der Wee, 
a puzzle why it did not evolve in this direction. He sees the Bank of Amsterdam as 
a continuation of Italian banking practices, while the more expansive practices 
pioneered at Antwerp were neglected, only to be taken up by the English when the 
Bank of England was established in 1693. There is much merit in V a n der Wee's 
formulation of the basic historical pattern of banking development. But it may be 
that the puzzling conservatism of the Wisselbank can be explained i f we come to 
know more about the role of the kassiers, the private bankers who functioned in the 
Republic. 
They remain shadowy figures. It was the intention of the city fathers to 
outlaw the kassiers when they established the Wisselbank. But by 1621 they 
operated openly again, and after 1659, when the distinction between bank money 
(bankgeld) and circulating money (courantgeld) was formalized by a bank money 
premium, the agio, it became common for merchants to deal with both the Bank 
and a kassier. 
Unlike the Bank, the kassiers offered credit - short-term credit in the form 
of advances on deposited security, and account overdrafts. Unl ike the Bank, they 
discounted bills o f exchange and, after the 1680s, they handled promessen, the 
promissory notes that served domestic trade as bills o f exchange served 
international trade. These promessen were credit instruments with a duration o f ten 
days. Thereafter they had no legal standing. But, it appears that among traders and 
kassiers they circulated much longer. 1 6 
The kassiers themselves held accounts in the Wisselbank, and provided 
those commercial services the Wisselbank did not. But were these kassiers 
important enough to alter the characterization of Dutch banking made by Professor 
van der Wee? We do not know. Since the kassiers do not appear to have lain the 
foundations of later commercial banks, it is tempting to dismiss them as a marginal 
phenomenon. But they were numerous - the Personele Quotisatie o f 1742 
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identifiée! 84 of fhem with a taxable annual income above 600 guilders - and they 
were not small fry - fheir average income stood at 2,000 guilders each. But the 
question remains, did bills o f exchange, specie receipts, and kassiers promessen 
circulate on a scale that measurably augmented the basic money supply? We do not 
know. 
Saving and investing 
The augmentations of the money supply discussed above ail involve some form of 
credit création. A n influential définition of capitalism, that o f Joseph Schumpeter, 
claims that credit création stands at its core; it is credit that diverts resources from 
fheir customary uses, that introducés innovation to the circular flow of economie 
life. 
Individuals can, of course, extend credit without the assistance of formai 
institutions, except for the légal institutions that enforce such private contacts. But 
the mark of a modem capitalist economy is the présence of formai institutions of 
financial intermediation, standing between the mass of savers and the mass of 
borrowers. The task of these institutions is to direct the savings to the most 
creditworthy of the borrowers, to select the most promising new ventures, and to 
mobilize the idle balances of savers. 
One thing we believe we know about the Republic's money habits is that 
these folks were great savers! In an unintentionally amusing section of Simon 
Schama's Embarrassment of Riches he describes the profligate spending that came 
inevitably wifh growing wealth, or, in other words, the érosion of Calvinist probity 
by that treacherous temptress Dame Money. Schama used the example of Comelis 
de Jonge van Ellemeet, one of the Republic's richest men. A s his income grew - he 
became Ontvanger Generaal van de Generaliteit, a lucrative office - he spent more 
and more. He indulged himself in luxuries that would presumably have shocked his 
austère, sober-sided ancestors. But what Schama could not deny was that this 
increased spending formed a diminishing percentage o f De Jonge van Ellemeet's 
income. His propensity to save did not décline, it rose - from an already impressive 
50 percent of income in 1685-1689 to an extraordinary 67 percent by 1704 (when 
35 percent of his 'profligate' spending was actually tax payments!).' 7 Schama 
sought to deflect our attention from this inconvénient fact by accusing De Jonge 
van Ellemeet o f war profiteering; the fact remains that his propensity to consume 
would not have impressed the genuine rakes so numerous among the contemporary 
Brit ish or French aristocracies. 
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De Jonge van Ellemeet, it is safe to say, was représentative o f nothing, but 
there were tens of thousands of Netherlanders in the Golden Age who were 
impressive savers. They included the 1,500-odd V O C shareholders who usually 
shared over one mil l ion guilders in dividends every year, and the tens of thousands 
- Sir W i l l i a m Temple, the English ambassador, claimed in 1672 that they 
numbered over 60,000 - who owned a share of the public debt, which paid out over 
10 mi l l ion guilders per year in the 1670s and over 20 mil l ion annually throughout 
the eighteenth century. 
These are only conspicuous and quantifiable examples of income streams 
that are l ikely to have generated large savings. The Republic's fiscal System was, 
by the last quarter o f the seventeenth century, a great money pump, sucking tax 
revenues from hundreds of thousands of tax payers and funneling it to a much 
smaller number of bondholders. If the latter group saved 25 percent o f bond 
interest income, they had five mi l l ion guilders per year to invest, which represented 
all by itself nearly 2 percent o f national income. 1 8 
We have, o f course, little direct information about the national savings rate, 
although the abundant supply of investable fiinds in the Republic has always, and 
not unreasonably, been thought confirmed by the low interest rates that prevailed 
from the mid-seventeenth century on. The question of how savers could frnd 
profitable destinations for this great stream of investable funds was often pressing. 
In wartime, the state sold bonds at a furious pace, absorbing the loose change of 
any- and everyone. But in peacetime, the public bond market dried up. Suddenly, 
enormous sums of money sought new destinations. 
So, what did savers do with their savings? Or, to put it a bit differently, how 
did investors come into contact with attractive opportunities for the placement of 
their funds? Here, again, we know very little. In the second half o f the eighteenth 
century, the merchant banking houses specialized in the floating of loans for 
foreign governments (the emissiebedrijf), relied on networks of makelaars, brokers 
who cultivated circles o f wealthy clients and peddled new issues. 1 9 But by all 
accounts this was a narrowly based and highly specialized intermediation. N o such 
intermediaries functioned in the sale of domestic government bonds. These appear 
always to have been sold directly, without intermediation, by the local tax offices, 
the gemenelandscomptoren, located in every city o f conséquence. These offices 
possessed the authority to adapt to their local markets, offering bonds in smaller 
units in the lesser cities, and larger units in the large centers, but this seems to have 
been the limit o f their salesmanship. 2 0 
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Our question remains: how did prívate borrowers find funds, and how did 
savers come to know of investment opportunities? It is possible that the kassiers 
played a role as intermediarles, and it is certain that notaries did so. Some of them 
had printed loan forms ready, suggesting a considerable volume of business in 
which the notary stood, literally, between the borrower and the lender. The notarial 
archives - a literal embarrassment o f riches for the historian - should be able to 
shed light on this scope of this intermediation. What w i l l be more difficult to 
detennine is how active notaries were in bringing lenders and borrowers together. 
D i d two men find each other and proceed to the office of the notary, or, as seems 
probable, did the notaries actively seek financial partners for their clients, who 
were eager to borrow or to lend? 2 1 It is likely that a study of this subject w i l l lead 
the historian to taverns and coffeehouses, where information circulated and clients 
carne into contact with notaries, kassiers, and prívate merchants. 
It is, perhaps, also in such venues that the participants o f partenrederijen 
found each other. Thousands of maritime ventures, but also industrial investments, 
took this form, where investors purchased anywhere from 1/2 to 1/64th of an 
enterprise. Once again, we stand before the question of how the passive and active 
partners in these ventures found each other. D i d the notary play a role in bringing 
them together? Were fhey typically bound together by blood and marriage ties? 
Were fhey neighbors or co-religionists? 
In the literature on the British Industrial Revolution much has been written 
about the irrelevance, or only the indirect relevance, o f formal financial 
intermediation in the financing of the new industrial ventures. 2 2 F rom this 
perspective, the weak development of investment banking in the Republic can 
hardly come as a surprise. Still , this economy had a special need for intermediation 
because of the large supply of savings. The relatively narrow range of investments 
that characterized the late-eighteenth century and the large size of idle cash 
balances referred to earlier suggest that this is an área in which institutions failed to 
keep pace with the developing needs of the economy. The unusual term structure 
of interest rates that long prevailed on the Amsterdam capital market also hints at a 
failure to effectively mobilize short-term lending. P. Dehing's research reveáis 
interest rates that fall with lengthening maturities (rather than the more usual 
opposite pattern), and this inverted pattem prevailed throughout the period 1620-
1730. The famous low interest rates of the Republic's capital markets seem only to 
have been available for long-term borrowers. 2 3 
18 Jan de Vries 
Income security in a volatile world 
One category of investment deserves separate discussion: investment designed to 
achieve a steady income stream and to secure the fïnancial well-being of the family 
over time. In a world of enormous uncertainty - both about the economy and 
mortality - this investment motive was always strong. Indeed, it remains important 
today, even though many risks faced by our ancestors are now buffered by the 
state. 
Thus, it should not surprise us to find that one of the earliest forms of public 
debt was the life annuity (lijfrente). Beginning as a feature of municipal finance in 
the middle ages, it became a staple of public finance everywhere. The buyer of a 
lijfrente was assured of annual payments to the assigned party - often a spouse or 
child - so long as that person - that lijf - lived. The death of the beneficiary 
extinguished the debt contracted by the issuer o f the annuity. It was long the 
custom for lijfrenten to pay twice the annual interest o f redeemable bonds 
(losrenten), which were extinguished only by the repayment of the principal. Thus, 
around 1600, lijfrenten paid the 6th penny (16.67 percent) when redeemable bonds 
paid the 12th penny (8.33 percent). 
It is a sign of the advanced state of Dutch capital markets that a series o f 
thinkers made important breakthroughs in probability fheory, demographic 
analysis, and the combination of the two, actuarial science, to replace the old rule 
of thumb with a more accurate mefhod for determining the appropriate interest rate 
on lijfrenten^ Christiaan Huygens, Johan de Witt, and Johannes Hudde all 
contributed to this project, which led to the discovery that current practice provided 
overly generous returns to all lijfrenten settled on beneficiaries under the age of 40! 
In response Holland adjusted the interest rates on lijfrenten to the age of the 
nominee, the beneficiary of the annuity. A s real returns feil to the level o f 
redemable bonds, buyers lost interest, and as demand feil, the sale of this venerable 
debt instrument was brought to an end. 
Wi th Holland no longer active in the issuance of lijfrenten, notaries began to 
provide private alternatives by organizing investment pools. Groups of some 30 or 
more persons invested in bonds, and concentrated the income generated by the 
bonds on the surviving members of the pool. Over 100 such 'tontine' associations 
have been identified from the notarial archives of the 1670s and 1680s. There may 
have been many more, but they disappear in the 1690s, when Holland, hard-
pressed to raise money during the wars against France, resumed the issue o f high-
interest lijfrenten. The peace of 1714 brought a definitive end to the public issue of 
annuities, and once again the formation of private income pools resumed. They 
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reach a peak of popularity in the 1770s, by which time research has uncovered 
some 250 of these schemes to secure income for survivors. These eighteenth 
century associations were larger than their seventeenth century predecessors. 
Organized by specialized brokers, they included not only gênerai survivors' funds, 
but also special widows' funds, burial societies, and orphans' funds. 2 5 
Once again, this incipient life insurance industry was eut at the knees by 
government compétit ion, this time by the French state, which issued annuities on 
the old basis - as i f De Witt and Hudde had never existed - in the dying days of the 
ancien régime. The foolishly generous terms of the French annuities left no room 
for the private income maintenance associations. 
Income smoothing in a volatile world 
U p to this point we have focused primarily on the problems that faced the well-to-
do in their use of money. Here we shall consider the use of money by ordinary 
folks. For people who do not engage in large scale borrowing or investing for 
productive purposes, the most important rôle played by money in daily life is to 
smooth one's income over time. 
When we consider the inherent uncertainty and volatility o f economie life, 
our first thought is to the incidence of poverty, and to the poor relief and charity 
which transfers income at a point in time from those who have to those who have 
not. There is, o f course, a second way to deal with the problem of insufficiënt 
income that is available to many (but not all) people: transferring income over time, 
so that consumption can be spread more smoothly than a volatile and unpredictable 
steam of income. 
It is useful to keep in mind that redistribution at a point in time does not 
require money. We have all heard of peoples who, when a large beast is ki l led, 
feast and extend hospitality until the beast has been eaten. It takes money to 
slaughter and sell the beast, and live from the income for an extended period. The 
former is more dramatic and more colorful; the latter is, for better or worse, 
modern. 
Consider the following example, drawn not from a remote hunting and 
gathering people, but from the Hollanders of the Republic. The trekschuit skippers 
who carried passengers from Leiden to Haarlem for nearly two centuries beginning 
in 1658 were organized in a guild. This organisation received passenger fares and 
paid for the expenses of operating the barges, including a basic salary for the 
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skippers. The salary paid to the skippers was modest, barely higher than the 
earnings of the assistants they employed. 
The guild records show that in many years the skippers earned nothing 
more than this modest salary. Indeed, in especially bad years the guild took out 
loans in order to be able to pay all its expenses - including these salaries. But in 
other years the guild made large profits. It paid off its debts and distributed the 
profits to the skippers. Suddenly, men who had been earning little more than 300 
guilders per year began taking in twice and three-times this amount. 2 6 
H o w did these skippers adjust to the sudden and substantial changes in their 
income? D i d they adjust their standard of l iving to the new circumstances, or had 
they internalized a notion of a 'permanent income', whereby they treated 
déviations as windfalls (or temporary shortfalls)? A n d were windfalls spent in 
extravagant l iving, after the marmer of the sailor returned from months at sea, or 
were they invested, as earnings in excess of one's permanent income? 2 7 
I f the skippers sought to smooth out their income over time, they would 
have invested in years o f high earnings, but what were the investment opportunities 
open to ordinary people in the Republican era? We know that the skippers' guild 
sometimes bought government bonds when it accumulated surpluses, but did 
ordinary individuals also do this? Redeemable bonds (losrenten) do appear in the 
seventeenth-century probate inventories of farmers and other persons of middling 
circumstances, but a comprehensive study of the bond market remains to be made. 
Our curiosity about this market is peeked by the knowledge that the social 
composition of government bond ownership shifted over time. In the first decades 
after the Revolt, when interest rates stood at 8 percent and more, merchants had to 
be dragooned into purchasing Holland's bonds, the ownership of which seems to 
have been concentrated in the names of women. A Century later, with post-fisc 
interest rates below 3 percent, bond ownership seems to have been much more 
concentrated in the hands of the very wealthy. 
Another investment possibility was real property, although its ability to 
serve an income smoothing function would dépend on the liquidity o f such 
Investments, which, in turn, would hinge on the character o f the mortgage market. 
Here, too, our knowledge is very limited. The English publicist Andrew Yarranton 
held the fluid Dutch property market before his jealous countrymen as a signal 
source of Dutch commercial strength: 'Every acre of land in the Seven Provinces 
trades all the world over, and is as good as ready money'. But it would be foolish to 
rely on the opinions of this rather feverish mercantilist. 2 8 
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Investment in a stock of goods for trade, offen to be conducted by one's 
wife, must have been a use to which windfalls were put, for petty trading and 
peddling was ubiquitous in the towns, and shopkeeping was the secondary activity 
of many households where the chief employment was likely to be characterized by 
irregular earnings, such as seafaring and inland transportation. 2 9 
The attention given by social historians to the phenomenon of poverty in 
pre-industrial society has conditioned us to suppose that most families l ived at the 
margin of subsistence, so that any interruption in their income forced them into 
dependency on poor relief and charity. But, i f the irregularity of the income flow 
had its occasional upside as wel l as the better know downside, the management of 
assets must have played some role in the smoothing of income over time. The 
ubiquitous présence of pawn shops suggests that many people had assets which 
they attempted to seil or pawn in time of need. 
The lombard, or bank van lening, carne to be a municipally-sanctioned 
institution for consumer credit, and small traders' credit, in cities throughout the 
Republic. A long debate about the morality of lending at interest for consumption 
purposes led communities throughout the Republic to outlaw private pawnbroking 
and money lending and to establish public pawn banks whose profits would 
support the poor relief efforts o f the diaconates. B y the late-eighteenth Century 
some 85 such pawn banks were in opération. The Rotterdam Bank van Lening, for 
example, had 71,563 loans outstanding in 1794, or perhaps these should be 
understood as so many items in pawn. When the 100 largest o f these loans, 
averaging a thousand guilders each, are set aside, the average loan was for 5.5 
guilders. 
Pawn banks also served small producers and traders. Consider the case of 
the Gouda pipemakers, most o f whom were poor as church mice. If their daily 
production could not be sold, they were unlikely to have the means to finance the 
next day's production costs. To prevent their ruin, or their falling under the control 
of large merchants, the city established a bank van lening which bought up any 
unsold pipes at the prevailing price, fhereby financing the pipemakers and 
providing for an orderly marketing of output. 
The Amsterdam Bank van Lening lent extensively to small merchants and 
traders in the decades after its founding in 1614, although by the eighteenth Century 
its clientèle appears to have become almost exclusively persons pawning 
possessions for consumption purposes. 3 0 A n example of such petty pawning is 
provided by an inventory drawn up in 1761 for the benefit o f Amsterdam's 
Burgerweeshuis when Marretje Venloo, a poor widow, died leaving three children, 
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the youngest o f whom entered the orphanage. The widow owned a bare mmimum 
of possessions, valued altogether at only 22 guilders. Her estate also included fïve 
lombart briefjes, évidence that she had pawned, over the previous year, various 
articles o f clothing (een rok, twee hemden, een boeselaar, een half hemt) for a total 
of 7 guilders 15 stuivers. 3 1 
What became of such a poor person once the pawnable goods were at the 
lombard? Was there any alternative to a dependence on poor relief? Could a poor 
person in the Republic still command credit? Here the probate inventories give an 
unequivocal answer: ordinary people with few assets received credit on a large 
scale. In fact, it does not appear that cash transactions on a day-by-day basis were 
customary, even among people who had large amounts o f cash lying idle at home. 
People of every income level were enmeshed in intricate networks of 
lending and borrowing. Few persons, it seems, were only lenders or only 
borrowers. Thus, o f 282 inventories drawn up by Amsterdam's Burgerweeshuis in 
the 1740s - ail for poor persons - 241 of them had left debts for goods and services 
averaging over 300 guilders. In addition, 102 had borrowed money, in loans 
averaging nearly 200 guilders. Moreover, 40 of these modest folk had collectable 
loans outstanding; their estâtes were owed an average of 150 guilders. 3 2 
A more broad-ranging study of Amsterdam probate inventories conducted 
by J .A. Faber (478 inventories in every income category, all drawn up in 1701-
1710), found that frnancial claims and debts were both a large part o f the total 
wealth in every income bracket. The rich no less than the poor were both borrowers 
and lenders. In général, the size of a person's debts rose with his or her assets, 
which suggests that debt was an inévitable part of daily life in the Republic. F rom 
rich to poor, everyone owed money; at all income levels, a very large number of 
people were owed money (Table 2). 
One might suppose that such a pattern of debt and credit bespeaks a cash-
short society, where money was scarce except perhaps once a year when crops 
were sold after the harvests. But we are obviously not dealing with an agrarian 
economy, and we have already established that the Republic was relatively 
abundantly supplied with money, indeed, that the very people enmeshed in this 
web of credit often held significant cash balances. 
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Table 2. Incidence of cash holdings, debts, and fïnancial claims by wealth 
category in Amsterdam, 1701-1710 
Wealth category I II III IV V 
Total inventories 56 18 53 148 203 
Cash, bullion, and bank deposits 9414 6525 1732 973 473 
(% of inventories) 84 94 92 94 97 
Claims 9923 10300 5227 1419 1092 
(% of inventories) 95 100 91 97 99 
Debts 12083 8555 5348 1757 800 
(% of inventories) 86 83 89 97 97 
Source: J.A. Faber, 'inhabitants of Amsterdam and their Possessions, 1701-1710', A.A.G. Bijdragen 23 
(1980) 149-155. The Wealth catégories are based on the assessment of burial taxes (the middel op 
begraven). I, the highest category, included only 2 percent of all burials (but a larger percentage of adult 
burials); V , the lowest category, paid no tax, and embraced fully 86 percent of all burials (but a smaller 
percentage of adults). 
A füll explanation of this phenomenon w i l l require fiirther research, but it 
does appear fhat a pronounced seasonal pattern of payments characterized the 
urban as well as the rural economy. Rental contacts for housing and contacts 
regulating the hiring of domestic servants were typically for six-month periods, 
usually expiring on 1 M a y and 1 November. 3 3 A t the higher level o f Wisselbank 
transactions we see a similar pattern. When Amsterdam suppressed the activities o f 
the kassiers in 1608, a large number of merchants protested, saying fhey would 
miss the kassiers ' services, 
doch principalijck ultimo juni ende ultimo november, alsser veel hondert 
duysent florenen tegelijk moeten betaelt, getrocken ende gedisponeert 
worden. 
M u c h later, after 1700, the Bank van Middelburg was in the habit of closing its 
doors to business twice a year to balance the accounts - from Pentecost for eight 
days, and from mid-December until 2 January. 3 4 
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We stand here before a puzzle. A society awash in cash l ived by credit. A n 
urban society with no highly pronounced seasonal rhythm, none the less 
concentrated many ordinary payments into six-monthly cycles. Some of these 
patterns of financial behavior lived on into this Century, and perhaps for this reason 
we are inclined to view these credit practices as those of a poor society. This seems 
almost certainly to be misleading, but a satisfactory explanation remains to be 
supplied. 
Conclusions 
The Dutch Republic is part o f the history o f early modern Europe, and that 
history is often presented as proceeding through a k ind o f transition, where o ld 
and new rubbed against each other, giving rise to cultural tension and often 
surprising, mixed forms of life that combined the traditional and the modern, 
feudalism and capitalism, religious and secular thought. W i t h respect to the role 
o f money, it is easy to suppose that ai l sorts o f mental taboos had to be overcome 
in this period; that a money-based economy had to burst out o f a l l the restricting 
ties o f law, religion, and custom that had long confined it to narrow Channels. 
This is almost certainly a misleading way of thinking about the society of 
the Dutch Republic. To be sure, objections were voiced to various forms of 
spéculat ion, especially to futures trading, known by the evocative term 
windhandel. But with every lurch of the financial system of the late twentieth 
Century - whether it calls attention to derivatives trading in Chicago, currency 
futures in Singapore, or program trading on the N e w Y o r k Stock Exchange -
moral arguments continue to be advanced in justification o f restricting financial 
transactions. If the seventeenth Century was transitional in this respect, so is our 
society today. 
Indeed, our seventeenth Century ancestors may have been rather more 
conscious of money and its role in society than we. When a Golden A g e 
Hollander walked down the street, he was very l ikely to pass several people to 
whom he owed money, and who owned h i m money. Their mutual knowledge o f 
these direct, personal financial ties could not fail to affect their conduct. Today 
our financial dealings are lodged firmly in the 'private' sphère , a word that d id 
not have its current meaning in early modern times. 
Moreover, money itself was heavy, tangible, and difficult to hide. 
Investors were not on the té léphone or behind computer sereens, but v is ib ly 
present at the tax office, buying bonds, at the notary and the tavern, buying real 
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estate and selling the spices they received as dividends from the V O C . The 
refreshing 'matter-of-factness' o f Dutch society was not l imited to an 
unvarnished understanding o f human sexual foibles and récogni t ion o f man's 
tendency toward gluttonous excess. It certainly extended to the 'fact o f money' . 
In this context, the Republic 's spéculat ive excesses should be 
reconsidered. They are commonly presented as the product o f an immature, 
reckless, youthful capitalism. The most celebrated o f these volatile events, the 
tulipmania of 1636-1637, has repeatedly been represented as a bizarre trade, in 
which unknowledgeable traders ruined themselves and others in foolish, greed-
driven spécu la t ions . 3 5 The speculators, it is claimed, were naively unaware o f the 
power of money while the public authorities were still capable o f being 
scandalized by the worship of Fortuna and set about 'returning the genie 
spéculat ion to the bottle from which it had escaped, and corking it tightly to 
ensure against any récur rence ' . 6 
In fact, futures trading was quite common. It was subject to restriction, to be 
sure: a stream of edicts from 1610 to 1677 forbade trade in shares not currently 
possessed by the seller (blanco verkoop, the true windhandel). O n the other hand, 
future sale of shares in the seller's possession (hedging) was always permitted. In 
practice, the chief limitation to futures trading - which was conducted in V O C 
shares and many commodities - was the lack of legal recourse to disputed contacts 
or non payment. 3 7 Speculators were not prosecuted, but fheir contacts could not be 
enforced in the law courts. 
The financial dealings of the painter Jan van Goyen can serve to illustate 
how deeply financial transactions penetated seventeenth Century l i fe . 3 8 He was one 
of the speculators in tulip futures in 1636-1637. A t fhat point he was certainly no 
stanger to risky financial transactions, since he had speculated in real property 
continuously since moving to The Hague in 1631. In 1636 a rising market for, 
among other commodities, whale o i l and bone and tulips encouraged futures 
trading. V a n Goyen took out a contact for future delivery of some 50 tulips at the 
height o f the spéculative fever, in January, 1637. A t the settlement date, fhat 
summer, he would pay 900 guilders while, to secure the contract, he agreed to 
deposit two paintings, one of his own and one by Salomon Ruysdael. 
I f V a n Goyen was like the other taders, he had no intention o f taking 
delivery o f tulips; he hoped to find a buyer for his contact at a higher price than 
he had promised to pay. Wi th his paintings as margin money (apparently, he 
only handed over his own painting), he hoped to pocket a tidy profit. Instead, the 
rising market crashed within days of V a n Goyen 's fateful entry. There would be 
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no buyers for his contract. V a n Goyen never paid his 900 guilder debt, which is 
not surprising since the futures contract could not be enforced in court. V a n 
Goyen died, insolvent, in 1656, with the estate o f the seller still trying to collect 
its 900 guilders. Whether this fmancial setback was the cause of his later 
insolvency is not obvious. 
The tulipmania has gone down in history as a classic capitalist folly, 
perhaps the first great fmancial bubble. Guided by the moralizing pamphlets that 
appeared after the bubble burst (and which remain almost the only source of 
information about the event), nearly all writers have emphasized the irrationality 
of the fmancial transaction, a 'madness' fed by the amateurish naiveté o f greedy 
small-fry with no understanding of the markets. 3 9 There can be little doubt that 
human folly was plentiful at the peak of the spéculat ion (although neither V a n 
Goyen, a seasoned speculator, nor his seller, a Hague burgomeester, were 
exactly small fry), but the futures market in tulips was also part o f a process o f 
financial innovation that was by no means foolish; rather, it was an expression o f 
the Republic 's financial sophistication. 4 0 
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